Nick Barker sent me a link to a web page that shows (in about the most annoying way possible) how a Diebold electronic voting machine can be hack in 4 minutes with $12 worth of tools. I didn't look over the last Diebold machine I was in close proximity to in enough detail to remember whether it used this method of securing the memory card or not. Anyone else remember?

And while we're on the subject of electronic voting, Diane Rehm is interviewing Avi Rubin about his new book Brave New Ballot today. Avi does a great job of explaining in simple, understandable language why electronic voting is inherently insecure. I've picked up the book and look forward to reading it.

Avi mentions that adding verifiable paper records to the electronic voting machines significantly improves the level of confidence that one can have in the voting system. There are 35 states that have a law, administrative rule, or simply bought such systems. Utah is one of them, having a law that requires the verifiable paper trail. It could be improved, but its a good start.